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SUMMARY
Saskatchewan — and by extension, Canada — is the largest producer of potash in the world, accounting for 
over 30 per cent of global production. Perhaps the good fortune of having an abundance of such a valuable 
natural resource has engendered an approach whereby tax policy has not been considered a top priority. 
That would at least be one explanation for the alarmingly inefficient and uncompetitive potash regime that 
currently exists in Saskatchewan. New Brunswick’s potash-taxation regime is at least somewhat better 
designed than Saskatchewan’s, although it hardly stands as a model of efficiency. In both cases, poorly 
designed policies are hindering the provinces’ economic potential and, in turn, Canada’s.
Put bluntly, when compared against its international peers, Saskatchewan’s potash-tax regime is not only 
the most complex and inefficient, it can also be the least competitive since its tax incentives conditioned on 
dated production levels and investment sizes cannot be used in perpetuity. Whereas its international peers 
tend to tax all potash investment projects equally, the marginal effective tax and royalty rates (METRR) on 
potash investment projects in Saskatchewan, either itemized or aggregated, are so widely varied that it is 
possible to calculate a METRR gap between two different projects as much as 48 percentage points. 
The convoluted nature of Saskatchewan’s regime benefits no one — not producers, investors, or the provincial 
government, which is left without any revenue certainty from its most significant natural resource. In fact, in 
recent years, where potash production and sales value rebounded substantially in Saskatchewan from 2009 
levels, excessive tax allowances resulted in the province incurring three years of tax revenue losses from its 
potash production tax.
New Brunswick’s potash-taxation regime is less complex than Saskatchewan’s, but it is not efficient. The 
province recently introduced a price-sensitive royalty-rate structure that imposes a higher degree of taxation 
on risky projects. Greater efficiency can be achieved by using a royalty system that is mainly rent based.
Neither Saskatchewan nor New Brunswick needs to endure such a muddled and counter-productive 
approach to potash taxation. Simple solutions exist that would make both regimes far more efficient and 
competitive internationally. Both provinces should convert potash levies to an essentially rent-based royalty 
regime that ultimately taxes only revenues net of all the capital spending and operational costs. Any existing 
production- and sales-based ad valorem levies could be combined into a single royalty based on sales value, 
net of transportation and distribution costs and credited against the rent-based tax, thereby enabling, a 
steady revenue source for the government. Both unused capital and operational costs (deductible from the 
taxable rent) and sales-based royalty should be carried forward at the government’s long-term bond rate.
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1Saskatchewan is the largest producer of potash in the world. Potash mining is a significant source of 
investment and jobs in Saskatchewan as well as revenues received by the government. New Brunswick 
is also a potash producer but on a much smaller scale. It too relies on the economic and revenue benefits 
from potash production.
In this paper, we evaluate Canada’s potash tax regimes for their efficiency and competitiveness, with 
a greater focus on Saskatchewan, which is the dominant global producer. A royalty and tax regime is 
efficient if it results in the best allocation of resources in the economy to generate the highest standard  
of living. Businesses seeking to maximize profits will use price signals to determine how best to allocate 
capital and labour — they will, for example, use more capital and labour to produce output when prices 
and profits rise. If taxes and royalties vary across business activities, capital and labour resources in the 
whole economy will not be allocated to their best economic use.  The loss in economic output arising 
from an inefficient allocation of resources will also harm competitiveness if an economy is relying on 
more costly economic resources to compete with foreign producers.
Through our cross-border comparative research we find that Saskatchewan’s potash tax regime is not 
only the most complex and inefficient among its international peers but also the least competitive when 
the conditional incentives, based on incremental investment above threshold levels, are not sustainable 
for producers particularly during economic downturns. These conditional incentives under the potash-
production tax were introduced on an ad hoc basis and appear to have lent a helping hand to the recent 
boom in potash investment.  While fast write-offs may boost capital investment at a moment in time, 
they can result in excessive investment, drawing resources away from other productive opportunities in 
the economy. A downturn in the economy can result in a quick termination of investment, with firms 
facing relatively high potash taxes when the spigots are turned off. 
Unfortunately, the restrictive conditions attached to these tax incentives based on investment size and/
or production volume pose both constraints and uncertainty for future investment planning. Therefore, 
Saskatchewan’s potash tax regime, on the whole, has become a hate-and-love story for business investors 
in the province,1 which in turn trapped the government in a dilemma: giving it neither revenue certainty, 
nor an easy way out of the tax jungle.
In comparison, New Brunswick had a simpler regime that followed a conventional revenue-based royalty 
with a single rate of 6.25 per cent. To alleviate the deleterious effect of revenue-based royalties on 
marginal investments, New Brunswick introduced a variable royalty-rate structure in 2014 that applied 
to production value. This variable royalty-rate structure is price sensitive with the royalty rate varying 
between 6.25 per cent and 15.5 per cent based on the price ranging from $325 (or below) to $750 (or 
higher) per tonne. In effect, a price-varying royalty is an ad hoc way of introducing cost deductions for 
investment projects since rents would be higher when prices rise. Such a regime however, is inefficient, 
as it deters investment, especially in risky ventures, since the expectation of higher resource prices by 
producers increases the cost of investment associated with higher royalty payment. Like a flat-based 
royalty, it discriminates against high-cost projects with lower profit margins. New Brunswick could 
improve its potash royalty system by moving to a rent-based royalty (with a minimum royalty on sales 
that is creditable against the potash rent-based levy). Such a rent-based royalty structure will help 
enhance both tax efficiency and revenue stability. 
1 Refer to Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce, Saskatchewan’s Potash Royalty and Mining Tax Regime (March 2011), 
which simultaneously criticized the government because it “charges a premium on its potash resources when compared to 
international levels” and adamantly demanded that the government maintain the current regime to preserve the growth of 
the potash industry in the province (http://www.saskatoonchamber.com/file/Newsroom/Research_Papers/2011/ISSUE%20
IN%20FOCUS.pdf).
2In early 2013, we published a research paper2 proposing a reform of Saskatchewan’s complex and 
inefficient potash tax regime in order for it to become a rent-based tax system.3 This subsequent paper, 
in which we include New Brunswick, will first compare the Canadian potash tax regimes with their 
international peers in terms of simplicity, efficiency and competitiveness, and then investigate their 
revenue patterns over the past decade when the potash price went through wild swings. Based on this 
cross-border comparison and our investigation of the revenue patterns in both Saskatchewan and New 
Brunswick, we renew and refine our proposal for reforming Saskatchewan’s present complex and 
inefficient potash tax system into a better rent levy. We also suggest that New Brunswick move to a 
simple rent-based potash royalty.
POTASH TAXATION: A CROSS-BORDER COMPARATIVE REVIEW4
In the world of potash mining, Canada is the top producer, accounting for over 30 per cent of global 
production, followed by Russia, Belarus, China, Germany, Israel, Jordan, and the U.S. We therefore 
include these eight major potash-producing countries in our cross-border comparison to assess the 
impacts of their potash tax regimes on capital investment.
As Table 1 shows, in all major potash-producting countries, miners face both general company income 
taxes and specific mining taxes; and the specific mining taxes are all deductible for income tax purposes. 
Some countries such as Russia and Belarus also impose general taxes that are asset-based and hence 
apply to both mining and non-mining sectors. Saskatchewan also has a retail sales tax on some capital 
inputs that directly contribute to the cost of capital consumed in producing potash; to a lesser degree, 
a similar sales tax cost on capital inputs also affects U.S. potash miners. In contrast, New Brunswick 
has harmonized its sales tax with the federal goods and services tax, which is based on value added. 
Therefore, like most other potash-producting countries in this study, and unlike Saskatchewan, New 
Brunswick has virtually eliminated sales tax on intermediate and capital goods.
2 
D. Chen and J. Mintz, “Fixing Saskatchewan’s Potash Royalty Mess: A New Approach for Economic Efficiency and 
Simplicity,” SPP Research Papers 6, 7 (February 2013), http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/
mintzchen-potash-online.pdf.
3 That paper was noticed by the Government of Israel, the sixth-largest potash producer in the world, and led us to expand 
our research to cover all major potash tax regimes around the world and help formulate a rent-based potash tax structure for 
the Israeli government. The outcome of this expanded research is our report prepared for the Second Sheshinski Committee 
on Mining Royalty and Tax Regime Issues: J. Mintz and D. Chen, An Evaluation of Israel’s Resource Fiscal Regimes for 
Non-Oil and Gas Resources (June 9, 2014), http://www.mof.gov.il/Committees/NatureResourcesCommittee/SeconedOpin-
ion_EvaluationOfIsrael.pdf.
4 This review is largely drawn from our recent report prepared for the Second Sheshinski Committee on Mining Royalty and 
Tax Regime Issues: ibid.
3TABLE 1: FISCAL REGIMES FOR NON-OIL AND GAS MINERALS: A CROSS-COUNTRY OVERVIEW (2013)
Canada/ 
Saskatchewan
Canada/New 
Brunswick
Belarus China Germany Israel Jordan Russia The U.S./ 
New Mexico
Corporate 
income tax 
(total  
government)
27 per cent 27 per cent 19.8 per cent 
(incl. an 18 per 
cent CIT and 
a 10 per cent 
surtax as a 
contribution 
to an  
“innovation 
fund”).
25 per cent 30.2 per cent 
(incl. federal 
and sub- 
national 
rates).
26.5 per cent 
(2014)
14 per cent 
for mining 
industry.
20 per cent 37 per cent 
(incl. the 
31.85 per cent 
federal CIT 
and the 7.6 
per cent state 
CIT).
Exploration 
expenditures
Expensed Expensed No special 
provision 
but follows 
the financial 
accounting, 
which is most 
likely an 
amortization 
over the 
estimated life 
span.
No special 
provision but 
treated as 
depreciable 
assets.
No special 
provision but 
treated as 
depreciable 
assets.
Successful 
exploration is 
amortized and 
unsuccessful 
exploration is 
expensed.
No special 
provision but 
treated as 
depreciable 
assets.
Assumed to 
provide a 30 
per cent initial 
allowance 
with the 
remaining 
70 per cent 
amortized 
within the 
length of 
useful life.
Election 
between: (1) 
70 per cent 
deductible 
with the rest 
30 per cent 
amortized 
within five 
years and 
(2) a 10-year 
amortization.
Development 
expenditures
30 per 
cent annual 
allowance 
on declining 
balance.
30 per 
cent annual 
allowance 
on declining 
balance.
No special 
provision 
but follows 
the financial 
accounting 
(see above).
No special 
provision but 
treated as 
depreciable 
assets.
No special 
provision but 
treated as 
depreciable 
assets.
Capitalized 
and amortized 
according to 
the useful life.
No special 
provision but 
treated as 
depreciable 
assets.
Assumed to 
provide a 30 
per cent initial 
allowance 
with the 
remaining 
70 per cent 
amortized 
within the 
length of 
useful life.
Same as for 
exploration 
expenditure.
Depreciation  
(SL = straight 
line, DB = 
declining 
balance, B&S 
= buildings 
and  
structures, 
M&E =  
machinery 
and  
equipment, 
MACRS = 
modified 
accelerated 
cost recovery 
system.)
25 per cent 
DB annual 
allowance for 
majority of 
depreciable 
mining assets.
25 per cent 
DB annual 
allowance for 
majority of 
depreciable 
mining assets.
Tax deprecia-
tion premium 
(TDP): 10 
per cent for 
B&S and up 
to 20 per 
cent for other 
assets; such 
TDP reduces 
the base for 
the annual 
depreciation 
allowance, 
which follows 
financial 
accounting 
practice.
Buildings: five 
per cent SL;  
M&E: 10 per 
cent SL;  
Automobiles: 
25 per cent 
SL;  
Electronic 
equipment: 
33.3 per cent 
SL.
Buildings: 
three per cent 
SL;  
M&E: six~12.5 
per cent SL; 
Automobiles: 
16.6 per cent 
SL;  
PC and relat-
ed equipment: 
33.3 per cent 
SL.
B&S: 1.5 per 
cent~6.5 per 
cent SL;  
M&E: six-20 
per cent SL 
(M&E for min-
ing: seven per 
cent-20 per 
cent SL);  
Automobiles: 
15~25 per cent 
SL;  
Computers: 
25 per cent. 
Accelerated 
depreciation 
allowance 
available for 
multi-shift use 
of assets.
Industrial 
buildings: four 
per cent SL;  
M&E: 10~20 
per cent SL;  
Automobiles: 
15 per cent SL; 
Computer 
equipment: 25 
per cent SL.
Initial 
allowance of 
10 per cent 
(for long-life 
assets) and 30 
per cent (for 
assets with 
a useful life 
of three-20 
years); 
officially spec-
ified useful life 
ranges from 
two to 30+ 
years, both 
SL and DB 
methods are 
allowed.
The MACRS 
categorizes 
depreciable 
assets by their 
useful lives: 
Buildings: 39 
year;  
M&E: seven or 
12 year;  
Motor vehicles 
and computer 
equipment: 
five or 12 year.
Inventory 
accounting  
(FIFO = first-
in-first-out;  
LIFO=last-in-
last-out)
FIFO FIFO Both 
FIFO and 
weighted-av-
erage-cost 
accounting 
are allowed.
FIFO or 
weighted-av-
erage-cost; 
LIFO is not 
allowed.
LIFO is al-
lowed but not 
FIFO.
Actual, aver-
age or FIFO; 
LIFO is not 
allowed.
FIFO Both FIFO 
and LIFO are 
allowed.
Optional
4Canada/ 
Saskatchewan
Canada/New 
Brunswick
Belarus China Germany Israel Jordan Russia The U.S./ 
New Mexico
Mining tax Crown royalty 
(CR): 2.1 per 
cent~4.5 
per cent on 
production 
value; Pro-
duction tax: 
base payment 
(BP): 35 per 
cent of profit 
with a tight 
band of limits 
between $11 
and $12.33 
per tonne; 
Profit tax 
(PT): 15 per 
cent under an 
indexed profit 
cap, beyond 
which 35 per 
cent applies. 
See Box 1 for 
details on 
both Crown 
royalty and 
production 
tax.
Crown royalty: 
Based on 
production 
value with 
price-sen-
sitive rate 
structure, with 
the royalty 
rate ranging 
from 6.25 to 
15.5 per cent 
correspond-
ing to potash 
price/tonne 
from $325 
(and below) 
to $750 (and 
above).
A mining 
tax levied as 
a per-unit 
fixed amount, 
which is 972 
rubles (or 
$0.09); there 
is also an 
export duty 
for potash, 
which is set 
at 60 euros 
per tonne for 
2014.
State mining 
royalty: 15 
yuan/tonne, 
or 10 per cent 
on revenue; 
deductible for 
CIT purposes.
A general 
mining tax 
of 10 per 
cent, which 
is based on 
the sales 
value. But 
this general 
rate is varied 
significantly 
by mining 
product and 
can be adjust-
ed from time 
to time. (The 
royalty rate 
for potash is 
assumed to 
be the general 
10 per cent.)
For potash 
chloride, a 
two-tier rev-
enue-based 
royalty 
applies: Five 
per cent for 
sales up to 1.5 
million tons, 
and 10 per 
cent other-
wise; and the 
royalty base is 
the unpacked 
ex-work value 
excluding 
“the proper 
expenses of 
packaging, 
sales fee and 
insurance and 
transporta-
tion” and a 
further 10 per 
cent deduc-
tion.
Ad valorem 
royalty based 
on sales is 
125 dinar per 
tonne for pot-
ash; maximum 
25 per cent 
of net profit. 
There are also 
a variety of 
annual mining 
fees largely 
based on per 
square kilo-
meter of land 
for mining 
(e.g., explora-
tion permits, 
prospecting 
licences, 
certificates of 
discovery and 
mining rights) 
and the type 
of mineral 
production.
Mineral-re-
sources 
extraction tax 
is based on 
the sales val-
ue net of VAT 
(and customs 
duties) and 
transportation 
and delivery 
costs, or cost 
of production; 
the tax rate 
is four per 
cent for Apa-
tite-nipheline, 
apatite and 
phosphorite 
oresis.
There are two 
parallel state 
levies on pot-
ash mining: (1) 
The state sev-
erance tax for 
manganese is 
0.125 percent; 
and (2) the 
state resource 
excise tax: 
0.625 per 
cent including 
a 0.5 per cent 
resource tax 
and a 0.125 
per cent pro-
cessors tax. 
There appear 
to be royalties 
on potash 
payable to 
property 
owners: the 
federal royalty 
is one per 
cent and the 
state royalty 
two to five per 
cent by type 
of potash 
product. Both 
royalties are 
based on the 
sales value.
Other taxes  
(excluding 
property 
taxes)
Provincial 
sales tax on 
some of the 
capital inputs.
There are 
numerous 
other levies 
along with 
conditional 
exemptions.
N/A Asset tax up 
to 2.2 per 
cent, on fixed 
assets only.
State sales 
tax on some 
of the capital 
inputs.
Sources: 
1. Canada: various government sources including both official websites (e.g., http://www.nrcan.gc.ca and  
http://economy.gov.sk.ca/Potash-Tax-Guide) and our direct contact with government officials (e.g., officials at the 
New Brunswick Ministry of Energy and Mines).
2. Belarus: Ernst & Young, Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide (2014); and Tax Code of the Republic of Belarus, Chapter 20, 
and the Application 10 (http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=230139).
3. China: various websites in Chinese including: www.ccin.com.cn/ccin/news/2013/09/11/274974.shtml.
4. Germany: Federal Mining Act, at http://faolex.fao.org/cgi-bin/faolex.exe?rec_id=059848&database=faolex&search_
type=link&table=result&lang=eng&format_name=@ERALL.
5. Israel: Based on information provided by the Israeli Ministry of Finance. 
6. Jordan: http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/100673/mining-in-jordan-10-things-to-
know#section8.
7. Russia: http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartII/Section8/Chapter25.html, for Tax Codes of the Russian Federation,” 
Chapter 25; http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartII/Section8/Chapter26.html, for “The Mineral Resource Recovery 
Tax”; and http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-russiahighlights-2014.
pdf, for general company taxation.
8. The U.S./New Mexico: U.S. Master Tax Guide (2013), 344-45, for “mining company’s expenses”;  
http://www.tax.newmexico.gov/ for both resource excise tax on potash and severance tax on manganese; and  
http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/stories/2004/12/06/daily12.html?page=all, for federal and state royalty  
on potash.
5Saskatchewan has overly complex potash taxes including a production-based royalty, a potash-
production tax (hereafter “potash tax”) consisting of a base payment and a profit tax, and a revenue-
based surcharge targeting all resource extractive sectors; and these levies are designed to interact with 
each other and, in particular, the two-layer potash tax is embedded with tax incentives under various 
conditions, such as investment sizes and production volumes, varying by project vintage. For greater 
clarity, Box 1 summarizes these levies and their interplays.5
As for New Brunswick, a newly introduced variable royalty structure took effect in 2014. This variable 
royalty-rate structure is price sensitive and is based on the production value. The bottom rate of 6.25 per 
cent applies to production value when the price is at or below $325 per tonne, and the top royalty rate of 
15.5 per cent applies when the price is at or above $750 per tonne; when the price varies between $325 
and $750, the royalty rate adjusts proportionately between 6.25 and 15.5 per cent. For example, if the 
price is midway between $325 and $750, or $537.5 per tonne, the royalty rate would be the mid-point 
between 6.25 and 15.5 per cent, or 10.875 per cent.
In comparison, most other potash-producing jurisdictions including China (with its newly introduced 
pilot mining-tax regime for potash),6 Germany, Israel, Jordan, Russia and the U.S. follow a conventional 
ad valorem royalty that is largely based on gross mining revenue, net of transportation and distribution 
cost. In Belarus, in lieu of a mining royalty, the government collects a unit-based export duty that 
impacts the cost of capital similar to a revenue-based royalty. In the meantime, Belarus, Jordan (with its 
additional annual mining fees), and China (with its unreformed mining-tax regime) also collect a fixed 
amount of mining levy that is either unit based, or differs by type of mining activity combined with 
5 
For more details, refer to Chen and Mintz, “Fixing Saskatchewan’s.”
6 China has introduced an ad valorem royalty for potash mining, which is implemented only in Hubei province as a pilot 
project. The rest of its potash industry is still paying a fixed royalty of 15 yuan per metric tonne (about $2.50 per tonne)
Box 1: Saskatchewan’s Potash Fiscal Regime
The Crown royalty: The effective royalty rate ranges from 2.1 to 4.5 per cent and the royalty base is 
the value of production priced for the lowest grade of product. 
The potash-production tax: Two layers:
(1) The base payment: the tax rate is 35 per cent and the tax base is a minimum of $11 and max-
imum of $12.33 per K2O (potassium oxide) tonne. The total base payment provides a credit 
for the Crown royalty and an additional one per cent resource credit that is based on the 
gross revenue. After these credits, any positive balance of base payment is creditable against 
the profit tax (see below) and negative balance is “restored” to zero. A 10-year holiday is 
provided for new investment projects.
(2) The profit tax: the tax rate is two-tiered, based on an annually adjusted profit bracket, which 
is $66.17 per tonne for 2014: 15 per cent on profit up to $66.17 and 35 per cent otherwise. The 
maximum taxable volume is the average sales in 2001–2002 for firms that existed then, and 
75 per cent of total sales up to 1 million tonnes for newcomers. Under this profit tax, a 120 per 
cent allowance is provided for both exploration and development expenditures. Investment 
in depreciable capital exceeding 90 per cent of the 2002 investment level is also entitled to 
a 120 per cent allowance, and investment below 90 per cent of the 2002 investment level is 
written off at 35 per cent on a declining-balance basis.
The resource surcharge: Three per cent on the sales value, akin to an ad valorem royalty but under 
the name of provincial capital tax.
6or without other criteria (such as area of land used). All countries allow their royalties or mining taxes 
targeting potash and any other industrial minerals to be deducted for income tax purposes. 
As is well known, the conventional revenue-or unit-based resource levies are inefficient, as their taxing 
bases are production or sales value and independent of costs. Hence, the effective tax rate on the return 
to capital moves in the opposite direction from mining margins. That is, for a given revenue-based 
statutory royalty rate, a higher margin is associated with a lower effective tax rate on profitability. 
Saskatchewan’s potash-production taxes are intended to avoid such an inefficient revenue-based royalty 
through some sophisticated crediting mechanisms. Unfortunately, the ultimate potash-mining taxation 
in Saskatchewan, in the name of a production tax, is affected by profit-insensitive restrictions that 
substantially diminish its correlation with profits; furthermore, the ad hoc tax incentives significantly 
hamper tax efficiency by distorting the level and structure of investment.7 Therefore, Saskatchewan’s 
potash regime is less efficient than its international peers because the latter at least tax all their potash 
investment projects more neutrally and with less distortion.
To our observation, and as pointed out in our previous paper,8 the main problems with Saskatchewan’s 
potash mining tax regime are the following. 
1. The royalty, which taxes potash mining value with great precision through a finely designed grading 
scheme,9 is further complicated by its interaction with the base payment under the production tax 
(see below). 
2. The base payment of the potash tax virtually results in zero revenue10 by providing credit for the 
aforementioned revenue-based royalty and an additional one per cent (revenue-based) resource tax 
credit (should the royalty itself be insufficient to offset this base payment). Not to mention the 10-
year tax holiday for new investment projects or the base payment’s creditability against the profit 
tax (see below) for “mature” projects. It is therefore an unnecessary layer that adds complexity and 
distortions to the entire potash tax regime. 
3. The profit tax, the second layer of the potash tax, appears to be the only substantive part of the 
potash tax in terms of generating revenue. But because this profit tax is “discounted” by so many 
conditional incentives that are intended to encourage investment, its tax impact varies widely among 
potash miners by their investment sizes and vintages. On the whole, the design flaws make this 
seemingly profit-sensitive tax lack the transparency and efficiency of a rent-based tax that taxes only 
the cash flow net of both operational and capital costs.
4. The resource surcharge is a de facto revenue-based royalty under the name of the corporate capital 
tax. Therefore, combining this tax with the production-based royalty into a single royalty based on 
revenue would help simplify the potash-tax administrative and compliance process.
7 
For the chronological development of Saskatchewan’s potash royalty and mining-tax regime, refer to Saskatchewan Cham-
ber of Commerce, Saskatchewan’s Potash Royalty and Mining Tax Regime (March 2011).
8 
Chen and Mintz, “Fixing Saskatchewan’s.”
9 According to The Subsurface Mineral Regulations (1960), the royalty rate ranges from 4.25 to nine per cent according to the 
grade of mine-run ore as measured by the percentage of potash contained, ranging from below 21 per cent to 45 per cent or 
higher; with every percentage-point gap in potash density, the royalty rate changes by 0.15 percentage points. Because the 
royalty base is the production (not sales) volume multiplied by 49 per cent of the published selling price for the lowest grade 
of product, regardless of the actual grade of the product sold, the effective royalty rate ranges from 2.1 to 4.5 per cent (i.e., 
49 per cent of between 4.25 per cent to nine per cent), as presented in Box 1.
10 
Chen and Mintz, “Fixing Saskatchewan’s,” 2-3.
7In comparison, the newly introduced price-sensitive royalty-rate structure in New Brunswick is also 
intended to avoid inefficiency that arose from its previously revenue-based single-rate royalty. With a 
flat royalty, high prices lead to higher rents, which in principle should be subject to higher royalty rates. 
However, given the relatively stable all-inclusive cost, when prices rise (fall), the rent will rise (fall) 
faster (slower) in proportion to the price. The flat-rated royalties therefore tend to under-tax (over-tax) 
rents when prices rise (fall), pushing governments to undertake discretionary changes to the royalty 
regime during cycles. Further, the revenue-based royalty, by not allowing for a deduction of costs, 
discourages marginal projects, since prices just cover economic costs in the absence of a revenue-based 
royalty.
With a price-sensitive rate structure, there is a better correlation between rents and royalty rates as 
discussed above. However, the price-sensitive rate structure is an ad hoc approach to recognize the 
market-determined profitability of investments since costs are not explicitly deductible. 
Further, during the normal price cycle, the commodity-price peak (trough) often leads to a crash (boom) 
in sales11 with certain time lags in price adjustment. That is, when the price is still high (low) while 
sales are dropping (rising), the high (low) royalty rate associated with high (low) price can also affect 
profitability for miners in a pro-cycle manner. As a result, the newly introduced price-sensitive royalty 
structure may hamper both market efficiency and revenue certainty intended by the government in New 
Brunswick. 
We will further support our criticisms of the potash royalty regimes in both Saskatchewan and New 
Brunswick in the following two sections by first comparing the effective tax rate for capital investment 
at the margin and then investigating the revenue pattern over the past decade mainly based on the 
government statistics.
CROSS-COUNTRY MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES FOR POTASH MINING12
Table 2 presents the marginal effective tax and royalty rate (METRR) for the potash mining industry 
comparing Saskatchewan and New Brunswick with the other seven major potash-mining countries.13 To 
segregate the METRR impact of mining levies and those of the income and other taxes, we provide three 
sets of METRRs in the table: The first is with mining levies only; the second with both mining levies 
and company income tax; and the third adding all other taxes such as the assets-based tax (Russia) and 
the retail sales tax on capital inputs (Canada and the U.S.).14
Note that the METRR associated with any revenue-based ad valorem mining levies such as the Crown 
royalty in both New Brunswick and Saskatchewan is determined not only by the royalty rate but also 
11 
For example, according to the Canadian Minerals Yearbook (2009), Canada’s potash sales and exports both dropped by 59 
per cent in 2009 compared to their peak levels in 2008, even though the potash price peaked at $872/tonne in February 2009 
and its annual average for 2009 is the highest in history (minerals.usgs.gov).
12 
This section is partially drawn from Chen and Mintz, “Fixing Saskatchewan’s,” footnote 1; and Mintz and Chen, An Eval-
uation, footnote 2. Note that the gaps in the METRRs for Saskatchewan between our 2013 paper and the current one are 
mainly associated with the change in some non-tax parameters.
13  The marginal effective tax and royalty rate is the annualized value of corporate income, capital-related taxes, sales taxes 
on capital purchases and other royalties paid as a share of the pre-tax and royalty return on incremental dollars invested in 
assets held by the firm. For example, if the pre-tax-and-royalty rate of return is 10 per cent and the METRR is 40 per cent, 
then the net-of-tax-and-royalty rate of return is six per cent.
14 
In this category of METRR calculation, we ignore certain unit-based or activity-aligned levies in Belarus and Jordan due to 
the lack of specific information for converting them to computable parameters.
8the price-cost margin, or profit margin. For example, if the potash price is, on average, $380 per tonne,15 
and the cost of production per tonne is $115,16 then the profit margin is 70 per cent. Therefore, for a given 
ad valorem royalty rate, say 10 per cent based on revenue, the effective royalty rate based on profit is 
about 14 per cent (= 10%/70%). In our METRR calculation, we assume a 70 per cent profit margin for 
all the jurisdictions where the royalty is independent of commodity prices. For New Brunswick, we 
adjust the profit margin based on the price range to simulate its price-sensitive royalty-rate structure. For 
example, for its top royalty rate of 15.5 per cent, corresponding to an average potash price of $750 and 
above, the profit margin used in our model is 85 per cent (= 1 - $115/$750) and higher; and similarly, the 
profit margin used for simulating its bottom rate corresponding to the potash price of $325 and below is 
65 per cent (= 1 - $115/$325) and lower. It is also noteworthy that for a given royalty rate, the higher the 
profit margin, the lower the METRR associated with this given royalty rate; and vice versa. Therefore, 
we present for New Brunswick a range of METRRs associated with its range of long-run price-sensitive 
royalty rates. 
For Saskatchewan, we also present two numbers for each of the three categorized METRRs in Table 
2. But the variation in Saskatchewan’s METRRs has nothing to do with any price sensitivity; it lies 
in the differentiated capital allowance, which is 120 per cent for investment exceeding 90 per cent of 
a company’s 2002 capital expenditure and 35 per cent otherwise. By applying the same 35 per cent 
profit tax associated with the profit per tonne exceeds the annual profit bracket (e.g., $66.17 for 2014), 
the lower-bound METRRs are associated with the more generous 120 per cent capital allowance and 
the higher METRRs with the 35 per cent allowance. With the lower profit-tax rate of 15 per cent that 
applies to profit under the annual bracket, the corresponding two METRRs would be -6 and 10 per cent 
respectively, reflecting partly a much smaller tax benefit being gained under a lower tax rate.
TABLE 2 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX AND ROYALTY RATES, MAJOR POTASH-PRODUCTING COUNTRIES, 2014
Mining levies only Mining & corporate income tax Mining, corporate income  
tax & all other taxes
Canada: Saskatchewan -34.2 ~ 14.2 -12.4 ~ 17.7 0.3 ~ 22.6
Canada: New Brunswick 4.2 ~ 8.0 9.3 ~ 13.2 9.3 ~ 13.2
Belarus (excl. fixed-amount royalty) 6.7 13.9 13.9
China 6.3 19.5 19.5
Germany 6.3 21.9 21.9
Jordan 5.6 15.6 15.6
Israel (with the 10 per cent statutory 
royalty rate)
11 16.1 16.1
Russia 2.5 19.1 21.6
U.S.: New Mexico (with five per cent 
royalty)
3.8 16.8 20.7
Simple average across all countries* 6.9 16.9 18.1
* To avoid confusion, this simple average does not include the lower bound of METRRs in Saskatchewan and New Brunswick.
By looking at the first set of METRRs that covers only mining levies, Saskatchewan’s two METRRs — 
14.2 per cent versus -34.2 per cent — form its upper and lower bounds and are respectively the highest 
and the lowest among all countries. As reviewed above, the mining levies in Saskatchewan virtually 
include three layers: the royalty based on a specified production value with a simple average rate of 3.3 
15 This is roughly the 2013 average price for potash, based on http://www.indexmundi.com.
16 
This is roughly the 2013 cash cost, based on PotashCorp’s Potash Cost Profile, http://www.potashcorp.com.
9per cent,17 the three per cent resource surcharge, and the two-rate profit tax (i.e., 15 or 35 per cent at the 
margin) under the potash tax. 
By adding the federal and provincial corporate income tax, which is 27 per cent in Saskatchewan, the 
higher METRR in Saskatchewan is increased by only 3.5 percentage points to 17.7 per cent, while the 
lower METRR jumps from -34 to -12 per cent. Further, including the provincial sales tax increases 
Saskatchewan’s upper-bound METRR by another five percentage points. For the lower-bound METRR, 
the provincial sales tax adds almost 13 percentage points (-12.4 to 0.3 per cent) since the sales tax impact 
is greater when the pre-tax returns are lower, resulting from less corporate taxation due to incentives. 
In the case of New Brunswick, we provide a range of METRRs for each column in Table 2 
corresponding to the newly introduced provincial royalty-rate structure that is sensitive to the potash 
price movement within the range of $325-$750 per tonne. As the table shows, the METRR associated 
only with the provincial royalty ranges from 4.2 to eight per cent; it ranges from 9.3 to 13.2 per cent 
when the corporate income taxes are also included. Unlike Saskatchewan, the harmonized sales tax 
(HST) in New Brunswick is based on value added and has little impact on cost of capital. Note that, 
as pointed out above, for a given cost of production, the profit margin drops (rises) along with the 
commodity price. Therefore, when the price rises above $750 per tonne while the royalty rate is fixed 
at 15.5 per cent, the METRR in New Brunswick will drop, due to a higher profit margin, to below eight 
per cent when only the royalty is considered, and below 13 per cent when both the royalty and corporate 
income taxes are included. Conversely, when the price drops below $325 per tonne while the royalty rate 
is fixed at 6.25 per cent, the METRR will rise, due to a lower profit margin, to above 4.2 and 9.3 per cent 
respectively. In other words, the price sensitivity embedded in the current multi-rate royalty structure 
and its intended tax efficiency are limited to the price range of $325-$750 per tonne.
Compared to Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, the METRRs for their international peers are 
straightforward, despite their common insensitivity to profit. Taking only the mining levies, the modal 
METRR is around six per cent (Belarus, China, Germany and Jordan); when the company income taxes 
are included, the METRRs are within the range of 14 per cent (Belarus) and 22 per cent (Germany). The 
only three jurisdictions that impose further taxes are Saskatchewan, Russia and the U.S. These taxes 
added less than three percentage points in Russia and four percentage points in the U.S., but they added 
five to 13 percentage points in Saskatchewan. 
Overall, Table 2 shows that Saskatchewan’s potash tax regime is the most complex and distorting 
compared to New Brunswick and to its seven international peers. The METRRs in Saskatchewan, 
either itemized or aggregated, vary wildly among potash investors with a possible gap as wide as 48 
percentage points (e.g., from -34 per cent to 14 per cent)! And this wide gap occurs only because new 
capital investment by any given company differs from its 2002 level to different degrees.18 Furthermore, 
the upper-bound METRR in Saskatchewan (i.e., when the conditional tax incentives are unavailable) is 
the highest among all major potash-mining countries. That is, without the conditional tax incentives, 
Saskatchewan will be the least tax-competitive among its potash-producing peers in other jurisdictions. 
17 
Refer to Chen and Mintz, “Fixing Saskatchewan’s.”
18 This variation is similar to an “incremental subsidy” for research and development (such as 30 per cent of R&D in excess 
of the average past five years). Subsidizing R&D investment on an incremental basis results in the bunching of investment 
when firms can access the incremental incentive. Firms hold off investments when planned capital expansion is less than the 
threshold. Incremental incentives therefore result in excessive pro-cyclical investment. For this reason, the federal govern-
ment eliminated the incremental research and development incentive in favour of a flat-based incentive to avoid procyclical 
behaviour (see the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, Report, Finance Canada, 1997).
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In comparison, New Brunswick appears to have a relatively competitive royalty and tax regime among 
its potash-producing peers. However, its newly introduced price-sensitive royalty-rate structure might 
achieve the intended taxing efficiency only to a certain degree while simultaneously adding complexity. 
As discussed below, the economic efficiency can be achieved by introducing a much simpler royalty 
system that is mainly rent based. 
RECENT TRENDS OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM POTASH IN CANADA
In this section, we will explore the revenue pattern associated with the potash tax regimes in both 
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick. Note that the revenue pattern in New Brunswick reflects only the 
single-rated royalty regime before 2014 and has no relation with the newly introduced price-sensitive 
royalty-rate structure analyzed above. We also ignore the government revenue from potash leases, whose 
amounts are insignificant and relatively stable compared to potash royalty and tax collections in both 
provinces. 
Based on the annual report published by Saskatchewan’s Ministry of Energy and Resources, Figure 1 
presents the annual government royalty and tax revenue (in millions of dollars) for 2001–2013.19 It can 
be segregated into two categories:20 (1) the sum of provincial royalty and resource surcharge revenues, 
which are respectively based on the production volume or sales value, and (2) the potash tax, or more 
accurately the potash profit tax.21 To further explore these revenue patterns in relation to the industry’s 
activities, we add three more lines to the figure: the annual potash-production volume (in billion K2O 
tonnes), the annual potash sales value (in billions of dollars), and the industry’s annual capital spending 
(in billions of dollars).
19 
The original data on provincial royalty/tax revenue is for the government’s fiscal year that starts April 1 of a given calendar 
year and ends March 31 of the following calendar year. We converted this fiscal-year-based data to that for calendar years.
20 The government annual report does not segregate its potash revenue by royalty or tax items. Neither do potash companies 
report their precise royalty payment, which is normally embedded in the “cost of goods sold” on their financial reports. 
However, a news release by Potash Corp. posted on March 16, 2011 reported that its royalty and resource surcharge 
payments for 2010 were $70 million and $77 million respectively, which indicated a ratio of royalty to resource-surcharge 
of 10:11 for 2010. This ratio appears to be reasonable given that royalty is assessed based on the price of the lowest grade 
of product, while the actual sales value is associated with prices at and above the lowest grade of product. Based on this 
information and the annual resource surcharge reported by Potash Corp., we estimated that the sum of royalty and resource 
surcharge accounted for about 5.7 per cent of total potash sales revenue, which is reported in the government annual report. 
Applying this 5.7 per cent ratio, we estimated the total royalty and resource-surcharge revenue from potash mining in Sas-
katchewan.
21 
As pointed out earlier, the base payment as the first layer of the potash tax yielded little revenue mainly due to its limited tax 
base and the credit mechanism for the royalty payment.
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FIGURE 1 SASKATCHEWAN'S POTASH ROYALTY AND TAXES: 
  GOVERNMENT REVENUE VERSUS INDUSTRY ACTIVITIES, 2001-2013
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Figure 1 Saskatchewan's Potash Royalty and Taxes: 
Government Revenue vs. Industry Activities, 2001 - 20 3
Potash production taxes (in $M) Royalty & resource surcharge (in $M) Value of sales (in $B) - calendar year Total production (in billion tonnes)
Source: Saskatchewan Ministry of Energy and Resources, Annual Report, various years.
Three findings can be drawn from Figure 1.
First, the sales-based resource surcharge and the production-based potash royalty are two relatively 
stable, profit-insensitive sources of revenue to the government in terms of their relationship to potash 
sales. This is an intended revenue consequence by design. 
Second, the potash-production tax fluctuated wildly from $687 million for 2008 to a virtually negligible 
or even a negative amount after 2008.22 Such fluctuations appeared to be affected negatively by the 
investment surge and positively by production and sales growth. The negative impact of the investment 
surge appears to overweigh the positive impact of the production and sales growth in more recent years.
For example, the potash-production tax revenue turned negative for 2010 and 2012–2013 and 
produced only $10 million for 2011, despite the fact that both the production volume and sales value 
rebounded substantially from 2009 and exceeded their 2002–2003 averages. The key factor behind this 
disconnection between the potash tax revenue and potash sales was substantial capital spending, which 
in all four years exceeded the 2002 level of $98 million by more than $2 billion to $3 billion. Given that 
the 120 per cent super allowance provided for capital spending exceeding 90 per cent of its 2002 level, 
over $2 billion to $3 billion of capital spending in excess of the 2002 level implies an allowance of more 
22 This observation is derived from the relationship between the “government royalty/tax revenue” and the total “royalty and 
resource surcharge,” which, for example, were respectively $151 million and $284 million for 2010, implying a $133-million 
revenue loss associated with the potash production tax. It is also proved by Potash Corp.’s financial reports, which showed 
its total production-tax payment being -$9 million for 2009 and $0 for 2010.
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than $2.4 billion for both 2010 and 2011 and more than $3.6 billion for 2012 and 2013. No wonder the 
government incurred a tax loss in three of these four years and generated very little revenue in 2011 
through the potash tax! Only the revenue-based royalty collection kept the government in the black for 
its overall potash levies.
The flip side of this negative revenue story might be future revenue “surge” accompanied by future 
investment shrinking below the 2002 level. However, the more profound damage to the industry is the 
inter-temporal investment inefficiency caused by the government “incremental subsidy” based on the 
2002 investment level. While investment boomed during years when prices recovered, a fall in prices 
discourages investment from taking place. Without much investment, potash royalties adjust upwards, 
thereby reducing producer cash flows, aggravating the incentive to invest. 
And finally, in relation to the second finding above, the potash-production tax has not raised significant 
revenue sufficient to justify its complexity. Based on the implicit price index for GDP at market price 
(with 2007 = 100),23 the accumulated potash-production tax revenue over 2001–2013 is below $1.2 billion 
compared to the accumulated $2.2 billion from royalty and resource surcharges. In fact, as shown in 
Figure 1, during the period 2001–2013, potash-production tax revenue was below the sum of royalty and 
resource surcharges for every year except for 2004, when the 120 per cent super allowance for capital 
spending had not yet been introduced, and 2008, when both the annual average price ($630/tonne) and 
the total sales (over $7 billion) peaked and the industry’s capital spending only started to jump and 
exceed $1 billion. The main issue here is that the potash tax is far too complex in relation to its revenue 
capacity. 
No doubt the 120 per cent super capital allowance embedded in the potash-production tax enticed 
rapid capital expansion in recent years. However, any tax-induced capital spending can result in the 
building up of excess capacity relative to that determined by market conditions. Such tax-induced capital 
spending also disrupts government revenue stability while complicating the tax regime unnecessarily. 
We therefore proposed previously, and reiterate below again, a simpler rent-based tax combined with a 
revenue-based royalty that both helps preserve market efficiency and revenue stability (see below). 
Compared to Saskatchewan, the revenue pattern in New Brunswick is much simpler. As shown in Figure 
2, the government revenue from potash closely follows the combined pattern in price and production, 
or production value, which we estimated based on the annual average potash per tonne and the potash-
production volume in New Brunswick as published in the annual report of Potash Corp. This royalty-
revenue pattern however, is relevant only to the single-rate royalty (6.25 per cent) that existed before 
2014. From 2014 on, the current price-sensitive royalty-rate structure, as described and analyzed above, 
shall apply.
23 Refer to Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 380-0102, Series V62471023.
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FIGURE 2 NEW BRUNSWICK GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM POTASH: 
  IN RELATION TO POTASH PRICE AND PRODUCTION VALUE, 2001–2013
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Figure 2 New Brunswick Govenment Revenue from Potash: 
In Relation to Potash Price and Production Value, 2001 - 2012
Royalties on Potash (in $M)* Potash price/tonne (in $) Potash production value (in $M)**
* Obtained from New Brunswick “Public Accounts,” Volume 2 (various years); all the numbers here are 
converted from the government fiscal year to calendar year, and the number for 2013 is our estimate.
**Our estimate based on the annual production volume published on Potash Corp.’s annual report, Potash 
production (million tonnes KCl) in New Brunswick, and the average annual potash price per tonne based 
on the monthly potash price obtained from http://www.indexmundi.com.
IMPROVING POTASH TAX AND ROYALTY REGIMES IN SASKATCHEWAN AND  
NEW BRUNSWICK 
The above analysis shows that both provincial governments, Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, could 
significantly improve their royalty systems. 
Saskatchewan’s potash tax regime is highly complex and inefficient compared to its international 
peers. In designing Saskatchewan’s potash tax regime, the government provides an “incremental tax 
subsidy” based on the 2002 investment level and restricts its revenue collection based on production 
level combined with mine vintage. Such incremental subsidy and sophisticated restriction on revenue 
collection provided some short-term competitiveness (as indicated by a METRR of 0.3 per cent, Table 
2) while causing inter-temporal inefficiency in capital allocation. Simply abolishing them all would 
make Saskatchewan’s potash regime the least competitive (with a METRR of 22.6 per cent) among its 
international peers. 
14
New Brunswick’s potash fiscal regime moved from a single royalty rate to a price-sensitive, fine-tuned 
multi-rate structure, which still yields a relatively low METRR mainly because of a more favourable 
Canadian corporate income tax structure compared to those of other potash-producting countries. 
Is there any way out of this tax dilemma? The answer is an absolute yes. We suggest three significant 
reforms.
• Both Saskatchewan and New Brunswick should convert their potash levies to a simple rent-based 
royalty. In both cases, the current potash levies should be substantially simplified by applying a levy 
on cash flows. Capital spending and operational costs can be expensed so that only the net cash flow, 
or rent, is taxable. (And hence, no special incentive is necessary for stimulating capital investment.) 
To preserve the value of deductions given when the firm has little or no cash flow, unused deductions 
should be carried forward at an interest rate reflecting the degree to which the government shares 
risks with investors through the cash-flow tax. That is, with full risk sharing, the government long-
term bond rate should be used, as it is with Alberta’s oilsands royalty. 
• To ensure a steady potash revenue to the government as resource owner, both provinces should 
consider combining any existing profit-insensitive levies into a single royalty that is based on the 
sales value, net of transportation and distribution costs or output. This revenue-based royalty would 
be creditable against the rent-based levy with any unused credits carried forward at the same interest 
rate as that for preserving the value of unused allowances under the rent-based royalty (i.e., the gov-
ernment long-term bond rate), as proposed above. Such a revenue-based royalty serves as a minimum 
tax-preserving revenue source for the government in the earlier years of the project, but results in less 
revenue in later years when the project yields greater profitability. This revenue-based royalty there-
fore primarily affects the timing of payments to the government rather than distorting revenues.
• Similar to New Brunswick, Saskatchewan should harmonize its sales tax with the federal GST, which 
will immediately reduce the METRR for Saskatchewan’s potash industry from 22.6 to 17.7 per cent 
(Table 2), which would be below the average of the all-tax-inclusive METRRs among its international 
peers (18.5 per cent).
We firmly believe that Saskatchewan and New Brunswick can simultaneously achieve an efficient, stable 
and internationally competitive potash tax regime while attaining greater revenue stability by replacing 
the existing potash levies with a proper rent-based tax.
Our simulation shows that, by keeping intact all the non-resource levies (including the corporate income 
taxes and Saskatchewan’s PST) and replacing all the existing resource levies with a 45 per cent rent-
based royalty combined with a 6.5 per cent revenue-based royalty that is creditable against the rent-
based royalty, the METRR for potash investment will be 17.7 per cent in Saskatchewan and 14.0 per cent 
in New Brunswick, both of which will be well below the average of their international peers, which is 
18.5 per cent.
15
CONCLUSIONS
This study compares Canadian potash tax regimes in Saskatchewan and New Brunswick with their 
international peers in terms of efficiency and competitiveness. We find both regimes wanting. The 
Saskatchewan profit tax is needlessly complex and distorting. New Brunswick’s newly introduced potash 
royalty is sensitive to price changes but does not achieve desirable tax efficiency.
We specifically investigated the revenue patterns in both Saskatchewan and New Brunswick over the 
past decade when the potash prices went through wild swings. This investigation shows the current 
potash tax regimes in both provinces do not receive revenues sufficiently related to rents being earned 
by the industry, losing revenues during boom periods and raising too much revenue during downturns, 
pushing governments to continuously revise their royalty regimes and creating greater instability for the 
industry.
Based on our study, we renew and refine our proposal for reforming Saskatchewan’s present complex 
and inefficient potash tax system into a better rent levy. We also suggest that New Brunswick move to a 
simple rent-based potash royalty.
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DIGGING DEEP FOR THE HERITAGE FUND: WHY THE RIGHT FUND FOR ALBERTA PAYS DIVIDENDS LONG AFTER OIL IS GONE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/digging-deep-heritage-fund-why-right-fund-alberta-pays-dividends-long-after-oil-gone
Ton van den Bremer and Rick van der Ploeg | October 2014
BEYOND HOUSING FIRST: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEM-PLANNING APPROACH TO ENDING HOMELESSNESS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/beyond-housing-first-essential-elements-system-planning-approach-ending-homelessness
Alina Turner | October 2014
SOMETHING HAS TO GIVE: WHY DELAYS ARE THE NEW REALITY OF CANADA’S DEFENCE PROCUREMENT STRATEGY
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/something-has-give-why-delays-are-new-reality-canada%E2%80%99s-defence-procurement-strategy
Elinor Sloan | October 2014
AGGRESSIVE INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING BY MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE CANADIAN CONTEXT AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/arnold-intern-taxplan-v1.pdf
Brian Arnold and James Wilson | October 2014
LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR POLICY: MEASURING LOCAL PREVALENCE FOR AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/emery-autism-prevalence.pdf
Margaret Clarke, Carolyn Dudley, Daniel Dutton, Herbert Emery, Laura Ghali, Carly McMorris, David Nicholas and Jennifer Zwicker | September 2014
POLICY ADVICE TO ALBERTA’S NEW PREMIER
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/new-premier.pdf
Ron Kneebone, Jack Mintz, Ted Morton and Jennifer Winter | September 2014
DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NEED ALTERNATE SOURCES OF TAX REVENUE? AN ASSESSMENT OF THE OPTIONS FOR ALBERTA CITIES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/mcmillan-dahlby.pdf
Bev Dahlby, Melville McMillan | September 2014
